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CHAPTER 12
Dilthey and Carnap: The Feeling of Life,  
the Scientific Worldview, and  
the Elimination of Metaphysics
Eric S. Nelson
IntroductIon
In this chapter I will propose a reinterpretation of the early Vienna 
Circle’s project of radical empiricism by reconsidering it in light of its 
under-appreciated Continental sources. After briefly discussing recent 
challenges to the standard view of logical positivism, such as its social-
political context in “Red Vienna,” I examine the impact of “life-
philosophical” thinkers such as Nietzsche and—in particular—Dilthey 
on the thought of Rudolf Carnap. Dilthey’s modernistic advocacy for 
empirical scientific inquiry and his far-reaching critique of metaphysics 
as reflecting a conceptually unjustifiable and indemonstrable perspective 
expressing a “feeling of life” and interpretively (affectively, pragmatically) 
articulated in a “worldview” was embraced, via Dilthey’s student and 
Carnap’s teacher Herman Nohl (1879–1960), in Carnap’s pre-physical-
ist writings of the 1920s and the Vienna Circle’s 1929 manifesto. Such 
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2  E.S. NELSON
works announced the task of overcoming metaphysics and defending the 
scientific life-stance (Lebenshaltung) against its authoritarian, metaphysi-
cal, and religious detractors.
The argument developed here concerns the philosophical and 
social-political nexus of life, science, and metaphysics in Dilthey and 
Carnap. Popularized or “vulgar” expressions of what came to be called 
Lebensphilosophie often served a reactionary role in Germanic culture in 
conservative cultural critics such as Ludwig Klages and Oswald Spengler. 
Nonetheless, concepts such as the feeling of life, life as expression and 
art, worldview, and life-stance were critically deployed against traditional 
authorities, beliefs, and institutions in order to prioritize lived and scien-
tifically comprehended experience (Erlebnis and Erfahrung) and a more 
critical and experimental scientific and artistic spirit.1 Dilthey has been 
inaccurately connected at times with the “irrational” traditionalist and 
idealistic response against modernity and the Enlightenment. His works 
reveal a moderate liberal or progressive positivist dimension—one crit-
icized by Heidegger and Gadamer2—and a proponent of the sciences, 
liberal modernity, and their enlightening pedagogical significance for 
practical life.
Carnap assimilated argumentative strategies, primarily through indi-
rect influences such as Nohl, from Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics as a 
discourse lacking cognitive validity, and combined positivist, logicist, and 
“life-philosophical” argumentative strategies to demonstrate its cogni-
tive and conceptual senselessness. Carnap’s positive references to Dilthey 
and his under-appreciated sensitivity to a logic of the singular and the 
cultural during the 1920s shed a different light on his positivist project. 
These interpretive elements indicate that Carnap’s early thinking can be 
construed as a logical empiricist hermeneutics dedicated to interpret-
ing meaning. Rather than constituting a simplistic and one-dimensional 
reductionism, a caricature presented by his critics, Carnap’s positivist 
project belongs to the larger task of the pragmatic formation, cultivation, 
and education (Bildung) that furthers life by clarifying and elucidating 
it. In the conclusion, Carnap’s ultimately more restrictive logical posi-
tivism is contrasted with Dilthey’s unrestricted hermeneutical empiricism 
(“unbefangene Empirie”) that embraces the empirical while rejecting 
doctrinal empiricism (“Empirie, nicht Empirismus”).3
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12 DILTHEY AND CARNAP THE FEELING OF LIFE, …  3
the VIenna cIrcle’s PluralIstIc contexts
“Positivism” signifies a shifting, diverse, and contested collection of 
philosophical and scientific tendencies typically concerned with the 
advancement of scientific inquiry and making philosophy scientific. This 
diversity of orientations, contexts, and arguments also applies to the 
logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. Its members and associates were 
more widely informed by and engaged in the context of early twentieth-
century European thought than is characteristically acknowledged in 
their Anglo-American and analytic reception that tends to bracket this 
context as merely cultural and social-historical rather than of philosophi-
cal concern.4
An early example of the acultural, ahistorical, and depoliticized recep-
tion is found in the work of A.J. Ayer, which the history of early ana-
lytical philosophy is increasingly problematizing by providing a more 
nuanced and complex picture. After studying with the circle in Vienna, 
Ayer imported the Vienna Circle’s radical critique of metaphysics in 
Language, Truth, and Logic without the pedagogical-vocational and 
social-political orientation with which it had been earlier associated.5 The 
standard dominant account of the Vienna Circle in the last century inter-
prets it as primarily pursuing a synthesis of Austro-British empiricism and 
the new formal logic while (properly or improperly) ignoring issues of 
culture, history, and politics as well as engagement with other varieties of 
philosophical discourse.
This narrative was already normative in “continental philosophy”—
whose major figures from Heidegger to Gadamer and Habermas were 
hostile to empiricism—and it became the dominant one within “analytic 
philosophy” due to the influence of Kuhn and the inspiration of the later 
Wittgenstein and Quine. Yet this decontextualized history, with which 
many philosophy of science courses continue to begin, is problematic. 
The Vienna Circle’s logical positivism developed in a context dominated 
by the waning of neo-Kantianism and the emergence of new philosophi-
cal movements from Husserl’s phenomenology to the critical theory 
of the Frankfurt School. Scholars of early analytic philosophy, such as 
Michael Friedman, Gottfried Gabriel, and Thomas Uebel, have pursued 
this contextualization further by reconsidering the sources, writings, and 
import of the Vienna Circle, revealing how the differences within the 
Circle and the philosophical and social contexts of these figures are more 
multifaceted.
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4  E.S. NELSON
The standard view did not develop in Vienna but retrospectively in 
the UK and USA of the early Cold War period. After the rise of National 
Socialism, the murder of Schlick, and exile, Carnap and others found 
themselves in American exile. Under the scrutiny of the FBI and anti-
communist intellectuals such as the prominent pragmatist Sidney Hook, 
they were compelled to de-emphasize the cultural, pedagogical, and 
political aspects that crucially defined their earlier project.6 Multiple 
figures associated with the Vienna Circle (including Carnap, Herbert 
Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, and Edgar Zilsel) were 
involved in or supported democratic socialist political and pedagogi-
cal activities. Even its politically more moderate “right-wing” (Moritz 
Schlick, Friedrich Waismann) was more cautious yet still politically pro-
gressive in its orientation.7 These social-political interests, and the soli-
darity they perceived with progressive cultural movements in modernistic 
atonal music, Bauhaus architecture, and die neue Sachlichkeit, are deci-
sive elements not only to understanding the context and culture of the 
Vienna Circle but its philosophical program and especially its polemical 
character.8
More surprisingly, and the issue that will be at stake in this chapter, 
is the appearance of unexpected formative figures in the early history of 
the Vienna Circle such as Nietzsche, Husserl, Hans Driesch, and Dilthey. 
The “life-philosophers” Dilthey and Nietzsche are unexpected sources 
for the early Vienna Circle insofar as they were associated by scientistic 
and leftist detractors with the separation of the human and natural sci-
ences (Dilthey), the prioritizing of the aesthetic and the psychological, 
and an irrational and perhaps vitalistic Lebensphilosophie. This historical 
association is no doubt mysterious as long as their thought is errone-
ously reduced to an anti-Enlightenment “life-philosophy” that the early 
Vienna Circle opposed. It is not as unexpected if we consider how both 
figures advocated broadening and intensifying scientific inquiry and 
engaged in their own extended critiques of metaphysics and religion. 
Nietzsche and Dilthey criticized traditional and contemporary metaphys-
ics for its reification and forgetting of lived experience, and articulated 
a hermeneutical experimentalism or empiricism in determining scientific 
inquiry’s interpretive character.
Nietzsche is the one “metaphysician” who Carnap is willing to 
praise as nearest to science and art without metaphysics. Philipp Frank 
maintained that Nietzsche and Mach shared the same spirit of radi-
cal Enlightenment and were the joint point of departure for genuinely 
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12 DILTHEY AND CARNAP THE FEELING OF LIFE, …  5
(i.e. radically anti-metaphysical) positivistic thought.9 Dilthey appears less 
openly as an implicit source for a number of Carnap’s terms and argu-
mentative strategies.10 There are, nonetheless, passages that evoke in par-
ticular Dilthey’s thought in Carnap’s The Logical Formation of the World 
(Der logische Aufbau der Welt, 1928), his critique of metaphysics and 
Heidegger in “Eliminating Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of 
Language” (“Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der 
Sprache,” 1931), and—the less appreciated yet significant text for draw-
ing out this critique’s implications—“Theoretical Questions and Practical 
Decisions” (“Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen,” 
1933–1934).11
Dilthey’s critical hermeneutics of historical life is significant for the 
Vienna Circle’s development, since Carnap and others did not exclu-
sively articulate an internal account of logic and the sciences, as it 
might appear retrospectively. As the complete name adopted in the 
1929 manifesto “Vienna Circle of the Scientific World-Conception” 
(Weltauffassung) indicates, Neurath, Hahn, and Carnap promoted the 
broader cultural and educational legitimation of the scientific worldview 
(Weltanschauung) or, as Carnap and Neurath designated it to distinguish 
it from the popularized vulgar notion of worldview, “world-conception” 
(Weltauffassung).12 The character of this scientific world-conception was 
itself a matter of dispute, since it could mean either the extra- or non-
scientific defense of science in practical life (Carnap in the 1920s) or the 
expression of the unity of science as a system (Neurath and later logical 
positivism).13
In particular, the Circle’s “left-wing” presented the Circle’s activities 
as a living exemplar of a more cooperative (socialistic), open, and rational 
approach to the world, just as they interpreted themselves as being in 
solidarity with the progressive, artistic, educational, and social-political 
movements of the time as noted in the first preface to Carnap’s Aufbau 
and the Vienna Circle’s manifesto.14 In the life-philosophical and affirm-
ative conclusion to the program of the Verein Ernst Mach, published in 
1929 by Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath, and dedicated to Schlick in honor 
of his remaining in Vienna: “The scientific world-view serves life, and 
life receives it.”15 Two years later, Neurath still depicted the unity of sci-
ence—the ultimate form of reductive scientism for its adversaries—in 
life-philosophical terms as the work of a “generation,” and a tool of suc-
cessful prediction and hence of “life.”16
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6  E.S. NELSON
the Problem of lIfe from dIlthey to carnaP
Life-philosophical references and terminology are evident in the works 
of Carnap, Neurath, and Schlick. All three adopt to an extent the lan-
guage of Dilthey’s “life-philosophy,” employing words such as life-stance 
(Lebenshaltung), life-intensification (Lebenssteigerung), life-formation 
(Lebensgestaltung), worldview, world-stance, world-conception, and 
lived-experience (Erleben) as distinct from Erfahrung and Erkenntnis, 
reliving (nacherleben), and “feeling of life” (Lebensgefühl).17 Carnap 
introduced in 1921 the dichotomy between the cognitive and non-
cognitive in the language of life-philosophy, stating that “the intui-
tive feeling of life as a totality (Lebensgefühl)” cannot be conceptually 
determined.18
A number of expressions related to “life” were in common usage in 
ordinary central European thought by the 1920s. Words and phrases 
from—to use the categorization developed by Max Scheler—the so-
called Lebensphilosophie of Bergson, Dilthey, Nietzsche, and Simmel were 
often popularized in the service of conservative and reactionary cultural 
critique (Kulturkritik).19 Although popular Lebensphilosophie could have 
this reactionary and anti-intellectual role in Germanic culture in these 
vulgarized forms, such as Spengler’s Decline of the West and the biologis-
tic vitalism that fed into National Socialism, at least three “founding fig-
ures” (Bergson, Dilthey, and Simmel) were modernistic liberal thinkers 
as regards culture, education, and politics.
If at first glance the connection between Dilthey and the Vienna 
Circle seems indirect and obscure, a more systematic study of the works 
of Schlick, Neurath, and Carnap show a familiarity with Diltheyian con-
cepts and arguments. This is the case with Schlick, who explored issues 
of the “sense of life” and ethical life-wisdom in relation to Nietzsche and 
Dilthey.20 Schlick credits Dilthey with the distinction between theoreti-
cal scientific knowledge and practical life involving feeling and expres-
sion grounded in a feeling of reality (Wirklichkeitsgefühl).21 Although 
Dilthey never separated theoretical science and practical life as radically 
as the Vienna Circle, he is a significant source for their emotivism: the 
thorough separation between knowledge (Erkennen) consisting of cogni-
tive propositions and the non-epistemic expression (Ausdruck) of lived-
experience (Erleben) and feeling (Gefühl) that lacks cognitive validity.22
The early Carnap was acquainted with Dilthey’s thought; apparently 
not directly through the study of many of Dilthey’s works, but most 
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12 DILTHEY AND CARNAP THE FEELING OF LIFE, …  7
likely orally transmitted through his teacher Nohl. As Gottfried Gabriel 
describes, Carnap adopted concepts and strategies from Dilthey, rede-
ploying them from his bracketing of metaphysics in the 1920s to his 
more radical confrontation with metaphysics and Heidegger’s ontol-
ogy in the early 1930s.23 This adaptation is significant for revealing the 
broader contexts, concerns, and stakes of Carnap’s early thought, which 
is more philosophically nuanced and historically informed than com-
monly imagined by advocates and detractors.
To engage the question of why Dilthey might be significant 
for Carnap, it is helpful to distinguish Dilthey’s thought from 
“intuitionism,” “irrationalism,” and the Romantic and vitalistic reaction 
against the Enlightenment with which Lebensphilosophie was later popu-
larly associated.24 Dilthey’s thought has two primarily methodological 
axes, the empirical and the interpretive. In addition to empirical research, 
he argued for an interpretive—via symbolic mediations and social objec-
tifications—expression and articulation of life in art, science, and self-
narratives such as autobiography. Dilthey rejected, as already involving 
language and history, the intuition of spirit or life found in German ide-
alism, Husserl’s phenomenology, or Bergson’s life-philosophy.25
Georg Misch, Dilthey’s student, wrote his dissertation on the devel-
opment of French positivism (1900–1901).26 Misch described in 1947 
how Dilthey’s position constituted a “positivism of life” in contrast 
with phenomenology and logical positivism.27 Dilthey’s vision of a non-
reductive, pluralistic, and hermeneutical positivism aimed at a “non-
prejudicial and uncoerced empirical inquiry” (“unbefangene Empirie”), 
in order to embrace the empiria without the truncation of empiricist 
dogmas (“Empirie, nicht Empirismus”), contrasts with the more elimi-
native and restrictive interpretations of experience unfolded in classical 
empiricism and positivism.28 In his elucidation of the typology of world-
views, Dilthey interpreted the positivism of his epoch as a contemporary 
manifestation of one of the three basic varieties of worldview, naturalism, 
which has its own legitimacy and scope as an expression of life and way 
of understanding reality.29
It is evident from Dilthey’s works as well as his critics—Heidegger 
and Gadamer who criticize Dilthey for being a modernistic, positivis-
tic, and “scientistic” epistemological thinker lacking the perspective of 
ontology30—that Dilthey advocated scientific inquiry, liberal modernity, 
the Enlightenment, and their educational importance. He did this in a 
historically aware form under the altered intellectual and social-political 
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8  E.S. NELSON
conditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Dilthey 
is habitually described in philosophy textbooks as maintaining a drastic 
separation between the natural and human sciences. This distinction was 
not ontological or metaphysical but methodological. But even as Dilthey 
methodologically distinguished the natural and human sciences, as each 
science has its own objects and ways of approaching them, his new phi-
losophy of the human sciences presupposed a disenchanted and natu-
ralized world as disclosed in natural scientific inquiry and reflection.31 
Dilthey’s distinction was not primarily an ontological or metaphysi-
cal one between two distinctive realms of being; it is rather a meth-
odological one deployed in order to interpret appropriately the unique 
reproductive, reflexive, and reflective structures and processes of the 
social-historical world.
Informed by his historical transformation of Kant’s critique of meta-
physics, Dilthey opposed traditional and contemporary metaphysics as 
self-deception. Instead of providing truth, historical analysis demon-
strates an indemonstrable attitude rooted in and expressing a “feeling 
of life” that is articulated as a “worldview” and “lifestance.” A number 
of figures—including Hans Haeberli, Arne Næss, and Günther Patzig—
noted in the 1950s and 1960s the resonances between Dilthey’s and 
Carnap’s thinking.32 When Carnap was queried in the late 1960s about 
his relation to Dilthey, he expressed surprise at these connections. He 
even denied at this late point having read Dilthey’s works, despite the 
multiple citations of him and use of his language in his works during the 
1920s.33 There are citations of Dilthey in the Aufbau and “Eliminating 
Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language” that indicate a 
familiarity with his arguments and ideas. In Jena, Carnap studied with 
and was good friends with Nohl, a student of Dilthey’s known for his 
writings on Nietzsche and promotion of pedagogical reform. In this 
stormy period of war and revolution, Nohl and Carnap belonged to the 
progressive socialist oriented side of the Wandervögel, a movement of 
younger Germans advocating a return to a more simple primitive way of 
life and extended sojourns wandering in natural environments.34
Carnap repeatedly evoked feeling and a feeling of life in the 1920s, 
and these play an important role even in the collective statement of the 
Vienna Circle’s shared project. It is not merely the metaphysicians and 
irrationalists who feel and have needs, Carnap remarked:
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12 DILTHEY AND CARNAP THE FEELING OF LIFE, …  9
We too, have “emotional needs” [Bedürfnisse des Gemüts] in philosophy, 
but they are filled by clarity of concepts, precision of methods, responsible 
theses, achievement through cooperation in which each individual plays his 
part.35
Carnap speaks in passages such as this of Gemüt and Gesinnung; of affec-
tive dispositions oriented towards clarity and lucidity. Nonetheless—as 
with Dilthey’s emphasis on both rationality and its limits in relation to 
the affective and contextual character of life—this articulation of the 
emotional and affective basis of practical life does not negate the real-
ity that the generative nexus of life can never quite be comprehended: 
“die nie ganz durchschaubare Verflechtung des Lebens.”36 As in Dilthey’s 
writings, and unlike the endorsement of “the mystical” in Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus, Carnap refuses to identify the ineffability and mystery of that 
which appears immanently within the structured and open life-nexus, as 
practical problems of meaning and interpretation, with the transcendence 
that surpasses and steps beyond that life and the world. The question of 
the world cannot be sensibly answered in the world for Wittgenstein. 
Carnap’s reading of the Tractatus rejects its ostensible advocacy of “the 
mystical” by interpreting questions of the meaning of the whole and the 
world as practical issues of life.37
dIlthey, carnaP, and the QuestIon of emPIrIcIsm
The title of Carnap’s The Logical Formation of the World (1928) appears 
to play off the title of Dilthey’s last major work The Formation of the 
Historical World in the Human Sciences (1910). One work appears to be 
about the logical constitution of one aspect of the world to the next, and 
the other the self-interpretive practices of historically conditioned indi-
viduals and groups. Although at opposite extremes at the level of the-
ory, there is a practical family relation between these two works. In the 
case of the early Vienna Circle, most evidently in Neurath but also in 
Carnap, there is a pedagogical enlightening task to his epistemic-logical 
project.38 There is a basic orientation (Grundeinstellung) and life-feeling 
that resonates with contemporary movements of life that are respond-
ing to the questions of life. It is a thesis of Dilthey, also deployed by the 
Heidegger in his early “hermeneutics of factical life,” that life responds 
to and articulates itself. This thesis is not vague if it is understood to be 
a claim about immanence, self-reflexivity, and self-reflection. This latter 
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10  E.S. NELSON
dimension is lost in Carnap, as it is in Heidegger as well, although it 
lingers in the hermeneutical and practical dimensions of his thought.
Carnap’s “external” pragmatic justification of the place of the sciences 
in life in the 1920s occurs in this hermeneutical and practical context. 
This justification would be contradictory if the positivist ideal of sci-
ence consisted only of conclusions and theories that are required to be 
only cognitively valid and consequently value neutral even about science 
itself. Yet, significantly, the latter dimension of objectivity and neutral-
ity belongs to Carnap’s portrait of the “internal” conceptual character 
of the sciences. The “external” non-scientific practical justification of 
scientific and logical languages remains a hermeneutical-interpretive, 
affective-dispositional, or pragmatic concern and decision for Carnap. 
The decision for science can inform and orient practical life even as it 
is not itself a scientific claim. While the results of scientific inquiry are 
to be value free through rigorous examination and re-examination with-
out requiring commitment to one theory or ideology, which is the very 
power of science in contrast with religion and metaphysics, science itself 
is not value-neutral in the context of life. Carnap’s pragmatic justification 
of science would become stronger in later works such as Meaning and 
Necessity and make him a precursor to the post-positivist arguments of 
Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.39
Scientific inquiry is itself based in and oriented by a feeling of life, 
an affective-practical disposition, and life-stance. This life-stance is 
expressed and cultivated in virtues such as clarity, coherence, simplicity 
with fecundity, and sobriety, and it proceeds through experimentalism 
and explanatory hypotheses open to revision. The significance of value-
neutral scientific inquiry is then an educational and progressive one in 
relation to life akin to movements in other realms of life mentioned by 
Carnap—and discussed more thoroughly by Neurath—such as art (new 
objectivity), architecture (Bauhaus), music (atonal), education (school 
reform), social life (the labor movement), and politics (social democracy 
and anti-fascism).
The reductive program of Carnap’s Aufbau is misconstrued if its 
mode of explication of meaning in the context of education is neglected. 
Carnap did not eliminate “reduced” objects such as those of the social-
cultural domain and the individual; they are maintained through an 
elucidation of meaning in relation to more primitive elements and con-
texts. In Sect. 12 of the Aufbau, Carnap argues that structural rela-
tional descriptions would also address the question of a “logic of the 
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12 DILTHEY AND CARNAP THE FEELING OF LIFE, …  11
individual” seen in Dilthey and neo-Kantianism. While the English 
translation adopted the neo-Kantian expression “cultural sciences,” the 
German term Carnap used was Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences) 
closely associated with Dilthey and his students.40
The affinities between Carnap and Dilthey were criticized by his 
colleague Neurath. Carnap described in his diaries from 1928–1929 
how Neurath condemned the “idealism” of his account of the 
Geisteswissenschaften in the Aufbau with reference to Dilthey.41 Carnap 
maintained a Dilthey-influenced conception of the human sciences and 
explicitly identified psychology, as a science of individuals, as a human 
science in the Aufbau. Dilthey’s position was controversial as it was 
opposed by the positivist and neo-Kantian classification of psychology 
as a natural science. Further, in Sect. 23, Carnap concludes that “since 
Dilthey” the objects of the human sciences have their own autonomy 
and their own methodological and object-theoretical uniqueness. The 
constitution or reduction system leads classes of statements back to their 
experiential basis without eliminating their autonomy and uniqueness.
Here we can confront the myth of the hyper-reductionistic nature of 
Carnap’s project. Carnap’s reduction system does not imply, as Merleau-
Ponty and the prevailing tendencies of subsequent “Continental philoso-
phy” contend, that propositional classes are undifferentiated or that their 
significance is lost in elemental sensations. It is instructive that Merleau-
Ponty’s critique of logical positivism—to take one example determinant 
for later Continental thought—would not recognize Carnap’s early reli-
ance on gestalt psychology and meaning-holism, instead associating the 
Vienna Circle’s “reductionism” with a reduction to bare atomistic sen-
sual elements.42 It is revealing that Merleau-Ponty contrasted the direct 
access of consciousness to itself in Husserl’s phenomenology with the 
indirect access proceeding through linguistic and logical mediation in 
logical positivism. Merleau-Ponty thus intimated the hermeneutical char-
acter of meaning in the Vienna Circle and opposes it through an appeal 
to a direct intuitive bodily self-access.43
Carnap’s positive references to Dilthey as well as his sensitivity to 
a logic of the singular and the cultural during this period indicate the 
possibility of articulating his project as a logical empiricist hermeneu-
tics rather than the naive reductionism of his analytic and Continental 
critics. Without metaphysical certainties or foundations, as Dilthey and 
Nietzsche already argued, thought is inherently hermeneutical as there 
are no facts or data independent of interpretive processes. It is impossible 
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12  E.S. NELSON
to eliminate the hermeneutical situation of a context of interpretation, 
even if interpretation is identified with the pragmatically justified yet 
fairly rigorous criteria of logical coherence, empirical verifiability, and 
explanatory power. This later identification distinguishes Carnap’s early 
logical construction and reconstruction of the world from the aesthetic 
orientation of interpretation in Dilthey and Nietzsche.
A noteworthy aspect of Carnap’s context that connects him with 
Dilthey and the expressive tradition in German thought is the idea of 
the non-cognitive emotive character of forms of expressive life. Both seek 
to avoid reifying the non-cognitive dimensions of human existence and 
turning them into irrational idols. As with Wittgenstein’s proposition 6.5 
in the Tractatus, “the riddle does not exist” (“Das Rätsel gibt es nicht”), 
Carnap maintains that there are no “riddles of life” that are conceptually 
or scientifically answerable questions. They are not questions with appro-
priate metaphysical answers; they concern life-issues that are only about 
practical situations:
the “riddles of life” are not questions, but are practical situations. The “rid-
dle of death” consists in the shock through the death of a fellow man or 
in the fear of one’s own death. It has nothing to do with questions which 
can be asked about death, even if some men, deceiving themselves, occa-
sionally believe that they have formulated this riddle by pronouncing such 
questions.44
The riddles and questions here are practical and expressive, even existen-
tial in a non-cognitive emotive sense. They are not conceptual or theo-
retical questions for science or philosophy but with how ordinary people 
go about life and what decisions they make. The absence and impossibil-
ity of genuine metaphysical questions points towards “the mystical” of 
what cannot be expressed in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus; it points towards 
life-questions being primarily questions of practical life in Dilthey and 
Carnap. Metaphysical propositions, including those concerning moral 
and aesthetic values and norms, are not false or uncertain. They are cog-
nitively and epistemically if not expressively senseless.45
Carnap argued in 1934 that theoretical knowledge and science 
can and should inform and educate but cannot replace the duty of 
practical position-taking that individuals in the end must make for 
themselves—potentially for the worse.46 Theory can inform yet under-
determines practice; enlightenment through theory can prepare 
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12 DILTHEY AND CARNAP THE FEELING OF LIFE, …  13
individuals for choice through education but it does not prove or replace 
the non-conceptual practical decision (Entschluß).47 As in the Aufbau, 
practical life does not pose questions that can be theoretically resolved.48 
It is governed by pragmatic decisions that are often determined by 
unconscious motives and ideological forces that theory can at best 
expose and explain.49
The radical critique of “superstition, theology, metaphysics, tra-
ditional morality, the capitalist exploitation of the workers, etc.” has a 
pedagogical function of clarification and education against “distraction 
and mystification” (Ablenkung und Vernebelung). Such “narcotics” are 
to be excluded as theoretically senseless rather than rejected as concep-
tually false. Instead of producing indifference, Carnap concludes that 
theoretical enlightenment over the empirical sources and functions of 
the narcotic and “appeal, education, example” are taken up by practical 
life—which cannot be affectively or value neutral in relation to itself—
for its own sake in how it lives and makes decisions.50 Practical life—for 
Carnap as much as Dilthey—is a conflict of views or languages, of life-
positions and expressions of the feeling of life that cannot be resolved by 
theoretical and scientific knowledge. The function of science, logic, and 
philosophy is pedagogical and the question is whether, how, and to what 
extent they are taken up in life.
Reflecting his commitment to an Enlightenment model of self-for-
mation (Bildung) in the context of human mortality, Carnap continued 
to stress in his “Intellectual Autobiography” (1963) the importance of 
personal education, self-development, and the self-interpretation of finite 
mortal life in cultivating a sense of autonomy and personhood:
The main task of an individual seems to me the development of his per-
sonality and the creation of fruitful and healthy relations among human 
beings. This aim implies the task of co-operation in the development of 
society and ultimately of the whole of mankind towards a community in 
which every individual has the possibility of leading a satisfying life and of 
participating in cultural goods. The fact that everybody knows that he will 
eventually die, need not make his life meaningless or aimless. He himself 
gives meaning to his life if he sets tasks for himself, struggles to fulfill them 
to the best of his ability, and regards all the specific tasks of all individuals 
as parts of the great task of humanity, whose aim goes far beyond the lim-
ited span of each individual life.51
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14  E.S. NELSON
carnaP’s logIcal and dIltheyIan crItIQues of heIdegger
In his “Eliminating Metaphysics” essay, Carnap diagnosed Heidegger’s 
analysis of the nothing in “What is Metaphysics?” as a confusion that 
substantializes the logical operation of negation by erroneously posit-
ing and reifying “nothing” as an object. Negation is the reversal of an 
existential proposition that cannot be interpreted as affirming existence 
or an existent.52 Negation derivatively and immanently denies the factual 
and logical propositions that it depends on for its significance. It has no 
further cognitive meaning, nor an objective referent, such as—accord-
ing to Carnap—when Heidegger states: “Nothing nothings” (das Nichts 
nichtet). According to Heidegger, the verbal “nothing” (Nichts nichtet) 
is neither a thing nor a meaningless null. Nothing is the performative 
condition for the negativity that makes human thought and practices 
possible, including all positivity.53 For Carnap, the statement that “noth-
ing nothings” has no actual cognitive content that can be conceptualized 
and validated even if it expressively evokes feelings akin to poetry.
Carnap concluded from this inquiry, and his previous analysis of more 
traditional metaphysical utterances in “Pseudoproblems in Philosophy” 
(1928), that metaphysical utterances senselessly reify logical operations 
such as the assertion of being and nothing. The published version retains 
echoes of Carnap’s earlier lecture in which metaphysics was criticized 
through logical analysis and through a genealogical tracing of the his-
tory of words from meaningfulness to meaninglessness. Primary exam-
ples of this for Carnap are words such as soul and God as well as words 
such as life, existence, and being when taken as metaphysical. Their con-
tinuing power rests in their lingering earlier sense and in their affective 
aura. Such discourses have an ideological instead of a clarifying function. 
Logical analysis is not purely theoretical, as in later language analysis, as 
it serves an emancipatory function for scientific thinking and for life by 
breaking our absorption in the magic and mania of reified words. Carnap 
is concerned—akin to Adorno and Levinas in their more explicitly ethi-
cal-political assessments—with Heidegger’s “idolatry of words.”
In addition to applying formal logic to Heidegger’s assertions, 
Sect. 7 of “Eliminating Metaphysics” suggests the depth of Carnap’s 
debt to Dilthey. Carnap develops the argument from Dilthey that met-
aphysics is a transition stage lacking validity and contemporary neces-
sity. Metaphysics is no longer myth and not yet art. The priority of art 
and aesthetic lived experience (Erlebnis), a sensibility that lingers in 
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12 DILTHEY AND CARNAP THE FEELING OF LIFE, …  15
Carnap’s praise of music over metaphysics, contrasts with the standard 
understanding of Auguste Comte’s paradigmatic account—which was 
modified to prioritize art at the end of his life—of the hierarchy of 
developmental stages: (1) theological (2) metaphysical, and (3) posi-
tive (scientific).54 Metaphysical systems are, Carnap argued in accord 
with Dilthey’s position, at best impoverished replacements for art, lit-
erature, and music in being an expression (Ausdruck) of the “feeling of 
life” (Lebensgefühl).55 As Carnap notes in accord with Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche, and Dilthey, music is perhaps the feeling of life’s purest 
expression. This feeling of life is not a mystical or elemental force, how-
ever. Both Dilthey and Carnap are careful to distinguish this feeling from 
a metaphysical or vitalistic force that would underlie life.
Heidegger responded to Carnap indirectly by modifying his approach 
to the nothing, including in later additions to his criticized essay “What 
is Metaphysics?” and more notoriously in his lecture courses after the 
Vienna School’s exile in 1935 in which Heidegger celebrated their 
exile. Heidegger linked positivism with other forms of modernity such 
as Russian communism, Americanism, and the technological devastation 
of the natural world.56 Heidegger identified positivism with modernistic 
socio-ecological developments exemplified by the collapse of the fourfold 
(Geviert): human “massification,” the gods’ flight, the sky’s darkening, 
and the technological domination of nature.57 In contrast, Adorno o and 
Horkheimer diagnosed positivism as symptomatic of the failed dialectic 
of modernity due to its failure to unfold the critical potential of rational-
ity and claimed that logical positivism and Heideggerian ontology were 
two sides of one political attitude: one that resigns itself before the pre-
vailing world-order.58
between PluralIty and unIty
Notwithstanding the affinities between Carnap and Dilthey indicated in 
this chapter, Dilthey retained a more comprehensive interpretation of 
rationality as historically embodied in multiple forms of life and remained 
the more radically pluralistic empiricist.59 Dilthey would presumably, and 
legitimately, have extended his critique of the reductive positivism that 
forgets the heterogeneity of phenomena and the self-undermining of sci-
entific inquiry in its metaphysical totalization from Comte’s sociology 
to both Heidegger’s ontology of originary Being (Sein) and the Vienna 
Circle’s project of a unified science:
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16  E.S. NELSON
My attack on sociology thus cannot be directed against a discipline of this 
sort [i.e. the study of society], but is rather aimed at a science that seeks 
to comprehend in one science everything which occurs de facto within 
human society. Such comprehension would be based on the following 
principle: Whatever occurs within human society in the course of its his-
tory must be integrated into the unity of one and the same object.60
Dilthey was a controversial philosopher for the Vienna Circle. Neurath in 
particular appealed to the project of a unified science in repeatedly criti-
cizing Dilthey’s differentiation of interpretive understanding (verstehen) 
and causal explanation (erklären) as the primary methods of the human 
(Geisteswissenschaften) and natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften).61 
Neurath rejected such distinctive Diltheyian concepts as dualistic and 
as the remnants of metaphysics and theology.62 However, Dilthey inter-
preted the project of a unified totalizing science as being more indebted 
to metaphysics and theology than the experiential differentiation of the 
sciences, according to their objects and ways of accessing objects, which 
he encouraged.
Næss and Gabriel contend that Dilthey and Carnap’s anti-metaphys-
ical appeals to worldview and world-conception are as totalistic as the 
metaphysics that they reject. This argument is unconvincing insofar as 
feelings of life and their expressions in worldviews in Dilthey’s concep-
tion are inexorably manifold and pluralistic. Their incommensurability 
and agonistic conflict (Widerstreit) does not allow the possibility of a 
final resolution into one systemic totality.63 Carnap noted the plurality of 
feelings of life and their aesthetic expression in contrast to the sciences’ 
conceptual unity. Carnap and Neurath justify the world-conception prag-
matically in relation to life, yet both diminish the pluralistic and agonistic 
dynamic described by Dilthey as the conflict and contest of worldviews 
(Widerstreit der Weltanschauungen).64 Dilthey’s arguments for funda-
mental pluralism at the level of affects and concepts indicate his distance 
from Carnap’s program of unitary science based on a heuristic physical-
ism. Despite his commitment to the idea of unified science, pluralism 
cannot be claimed to be non-existent in Carnap given his pragmatic con-
siderations concerning meaning that culminated in the principle of toler-
ance unfolded from The Logical Syntax of Language (1934) to Meaning 
and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (1947/1956).65
Even if the unity of science is understood as a totalizing project, it 
is not a task that Dilthey advocated. Dilthey rejected Comte’s vision of 
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12 DILTHEY AND CARNAP THE FEELING OF LIFE, …  17
a unified science, and Neurath would repeatedly point out that Dilthey 
and his apparent influence on Carnap were obstacles to the idea of a uni-
fied science.66 According to Dilthey, there are at most temporary unities of 
experience and thought that cannot eliminate the differences and tensions 
of things and of discovering and inventing the most appropriate approaches 
to them. Neurath upheld that the nonsensical assertion of essence or 
substance (i.e. essentialism) is the source of the distinction between the 
human and natural sciences, and the psychological and the physical.
Dilthey argued for anti-essentialism from the opposite claim of the 
difference and plurality of things and human stances toward things.67 
While there is no ultimate metaphysical distinction between mind and 
matter or spirit and world in Dilthey’s works, there are distinct and mul-
tiple comportments and ways in which humans engage in and compre-
hend their embodied, worldly, and immanent existence. But whether a 
unified totality is organized through one transcendent supernatural or 
immanent worldly principle, both are equally metaphysical for Dilthey. 
Such tendencies are expressions of a life-configuration (Lebensgestaltung) 
that overextend the principle of identity by imposing it upon the con-
tingent plurality of the experienced world’s contexts and conditions. 
Accordingly, whether one unitary system is understood as feeling of life 
or poetic expression, as affective-practical worldview or unified scientific 
world-conception: “one objective, determinate, integral system of reality 
that excludes other possible ones is not demonstrable.”68
Dilthey’s “principle of phenomenality” and the early Carnap’s 
employment of phenomenality in the Aufbau reflect an attention to 
addressing experience in its “internal” or experiential immanence, its 
holistic relationality, and its linguistic formation and interpretation, even 
as both refused to endorse phenomenalism as a metaphysical doctrine 
about being. This tendency in Carnap can be seen in his earlier adapta-
tion of a quasi-phenomenological life-philosophical description of lived-
experience in the proto-Aufbau sketch “Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit” 
(“From Chaos to Actuality”) in 1922.69 The logical constitution 
of reality presupposes a non-logical primary experiential world (the 
chaos of lived-experience) that can only be cognized through rational 
reconstruction.
Forsaking his earlier quasi-phenomenology, the phenomenal and 
methodological solipsistic autopsychological point of departure intro-
duced in the Aufbau can only be methodologically and heuristi-
cally maintained according to Carnap, who would eventually abandon 
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18  E.S. NELSON
this overly subjective point of departure a few years later in favor of a 
methodological physicalism inspired by his colleague Neurath. Carnap’s 
diaries reveal how Neurath rejected the methodological solipsism and 
individualism of Carnap’s Aufbau in favor of collectivism and material-
ism.70 The methodological materialism of the 1930s need not, they 
argued, assume a metaphysical or ontological materialism that their elim-
ination of metaphysics precluded. In Dilthey’s case, phenomenalism—or 
what he described as the principle of phenomenality that indicates the 
co-givenness of self and worldly phenomena independent of any essence, 
process, or substance—is interpretive rather than metaphysical, connect-
ing the first person perspective of “inner experience” with the imma-
nence of the “principle of phenomenality.”71
Despite the mutuality of lived-experience and interpretive language, 
as well as the appropriation of non-atomistic holistic gestalt psychol-
ogy in the Aufbau that would place psychology closer to Dilthey’s concep-
tion of psychology as a human rather than a natural science, Carnap and 
Dilthey did diverge over the significance of the interpretive character of 
language and consequently of how to express and even what to count 
as experience.72 That is, whereas both are concerned with interpretation 
and explication, interpretation is construed as either primarily linguistic, 
as understood through the model of modern formal logic in Carnap, or 
as consisting of the full array of questions and strategies associated with 
hermeneutics and the lived life-nexus (Lebenszusammenhang) in Dilthey. 
Whereas Dilthey carefully portrayed how the life-nexus has its own struc-
tures and rationality, a theme later taken up by Husserl and Habermas, 
Carnap abandoned the rationality life-world to being an affective realm 
that could only be inspired and reformed by the model of rationality evi-
dent in the sciences. Rationality is increasingly identified exclusively with 
science and logic in logical positivism, which undercuts the pragmatic 
enlightening function that was emphasized in the 1920 s’ program of a 
scientific world-conception.
In “Theoretical Questions and Practical Decisions,” Carnap starkly 
distinguishes cognitive sense and theoretical science from the non-
cognitive and practical. Carnap’s account of the latter is in danger of 
lapsing into the irrational and eliminating the critical role of reason in 
aesthetic, ethical, and political reflection. Dilthey’s works suggest a 
more liberal and tolerant conception of historically embodied reason, 
as he traced the differences, tensions, and the continuities between 
non- or minimally cognitive expression and theoretical cognition and 
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12 DILTHEY AND CARNAP THE FEELING OF LIFE, …  19
knowledge. This is evident in their usage of the term Aufbau (formation 
or construction), a key term for Dilthey and Carnap. It principally signi-
fies historical formation of the multiplicity, range, and richness of human 
experiences in Dilthey, and logical construction in Carnap. The plural 
character of historicity and temporality entails the necessity of experien-
tially and experimentally engaging with the world. This open and plural-
istic empiricism is not only found in Dilthey. Kuno Fischer distinguished 
empiria as the experiential fullness and manifoldness of life from empiri-
cism, which posits experience as a basic epistemic principle and hence is 
experientially impoverished.73
conclusIon
As argued in this chapter, the early Carnap construed the critique of met-
aphysics as a crucial part of legitimating and ideologically and polemi-
cally defending the scientific life-stance (Lebenshaltung) against its critics. 
Dilthey’s critical assessment of traditional and contemporary metaphys-
ics included what he considered to be the implicitly metaphysical char-
acter of Comte’s positivism as well as nineteenth-century materialism. 
Diltheyian suspicions and fears of latent metaphysics led Carnap and 
Neurath to posit a methodological rather than ontological materialism 
as the basis of scientific inquiry. Dilthey’s analysis of metaphysical systems 
as expressions and articulations of a “feeling of life” (Lebensgefühl) in a 
worldview (Weltanschauung), which are more akin to works of art and 
poetry than cognitively oriented logic or science, shaped the anti-meta-
physical strategies expressed by Carnap in the 1920s and that culminated 
in his critique of Heidegger’s ontology of being and nothing. Heidegger 
shared this tendency with Dilthey and Carnap to the extent that he inter-
preted his own ontology as overcoming traditional metaphysics and its 
“forgetfulness of being.” Heidegger’s way of overcoming metaphysics 
appeared to Carnap as its reaffirmation in an existential-ontological dis-
guise, and a way of thinking with problematic political associations.74
Carnap and Heidegger increasingly abandoned the Diltheyian dimen-
sions of their early thinking. Heidegger shifted away from his earlier her-
meneutics of factical life, a model influenced by Dilthey and closer to the 
sciences and empirical life than his later thinking, while Carnap turned 
toward a pragmatic-semantic account of language and physicalist inter-
pretation of the sciences that was no longer explicitly conceived as part 
of a broader practical program of enlightenment and education. Unlike 
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20  E.S. NELSON
its earlier social-critical formulation, the elimination of metaphysics 
appeared more dogmatic, exclusionary, and restrictive than critical and 
demystifying for later philosophers.
Carnap’s cultural and political commitments cannot be cleanly sepa-
rated from his scientific and logical works. His early philosophy of sci-
ence and hermeneutics of explication are integral parts of a wider project 
of formation, cultivation, and education (Bildung) that furthers life 
through clarifying it. Scientific inquiry and education are interconnected 
with critical reflection and accordingly at least indirectly with social trans-
formation. Carnap’s early project can be interpreted as a deeply social-
political project formulated in a language affirming value-neutrality and 
objectivity as primary characteristics of the scientific stance that should 
inform and reorient social-political life. This value-neutral discourse was 
therefore itself interpreted as political, modernistic, and socialistic by 
right-wing opponents of the Vienna Circle and by its philosophically 
anti-foundationalist, life-expressive, non-cognitivist, and socially progres-
sive “left-wing”: Carnap, Neurath, Hahn, and Frank.75
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the Vienna Circle, see Uebel, “Education, Enlightenment and Positivism: 
The Vienna Circle’s Scientific World-Conception Revisited,” 41–66.
 47.  Carnap, “Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen” (repub-
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(2016) “Heidegger and Carnap: Disagreeing about Nothing?” in Raffoul 
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